Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents. (9th April 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhong, Chongyi; Yang, Hui; Wang, Chun
• Other Names: Xu Gen Q. Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Mathematical problems in engineering. Volume 2020(2020)
• Publication Date: 2020-04-09
• Subjects: Engineering mathematics -- Periodicals; 510.2462
• DOI: 10.1155/2020/1636294
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1024-123X

Abstract

Abstract : We consider stability of equilibria for population games against slight perturbation on the social state space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria for perturbed population games, which is very important and interesting. Then, refinements of equilibria for population games are introduced. Equivalent characterizations of perfect equilibrium are given. At last, it is shown that each population game admits at least one perfect (proper, weakly proper, and robust) equilibrium.