Germany, Versailles, and the Limits of Nationhood. Issue 2 (3rd April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fischer, Conan
• Is Part Of: Diplomacy and statecraft. Volume 30:Issue 2(2019)
• Page Start: 398
• Page End: 420
• Publication Date: 2019-04-03
• Subjects: Diplomacy -- Periodicals; World politics -- Periodicals; International relations -- Periodicals; 327
• DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2019.1619040
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0959-2296

Abstract

ABSTRACT: As a defeated Great Power, Germany faced exceptional challenges after the First World War. These ranged from domestic revolution to grudging compliance with a peace treaty whose terms Germans almost universally regarded as unjust and unworkable. Franco-German relations quickly assumed particular significance in this regard as each country sought to secure its vital interests at the other's expense; a confrontation that culminated in the Ruhr Crisis. However, there had been intermittent attempts to address security concerns through collaboration rather than confrontation and, after the Ruhr Crisis beginning in January 1923, these efforts rapidly gained momentum. The German and French foreign ministers, Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, developed a trusting relationship as they strove to locate Franco-German rapprochement within the wider context of European integration. Stresemann's death in 1929 did not stop this process that, under severe pressure from the Great Depression, finally imploded in early 1932.