"We will not make the bomb because we do not want to make the bomb": understanding the technopolitical regime that drives the Brazilian nuclear program. Issue 3 (4th May 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dalaqua, Renata H.
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 26:Issue 3/4(2019)
• Page Start: 231
• Page End: 249
• Publication Date: 2019-05-04
• Subjects: Brazil -- uranium enrichment -- centrifuges -- nonproliferation -- naval nuclear program; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1630094
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This article examines the centrality of uranium-enrichment centrifuges to the Brazilian nuclear program, arguing that these machines enabled the emergence of a technopolitical regime that invokes the trope of nuclear autonomy to advance policy and technological prescriptions. In order to understand the evolution of Brazil's nuclear activities, the article addresses the dynamics within this technopolitical regime and its interactions with policy actors and other groups in society. This analysis is useful to identify aspects that have characterized Brazilian nuclear policy since the 1980s, such as: the promotion of self-regulation as the primary nonproliferation commitment, the crucial role played by the navy in the development of nuclear technology, the fluctuation of financial resources allocated to the nuclear program, and the difficulties of relying on public funds for a long-term technological project.