The end of the "INF Treaty" and the US-China military balance. Issue 3 (4th May 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pasandideh, Shahryar
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 26:Issue 3/4(2019)
• Page Start: 267
• Page End: 287
• Publication Date: 2019-05-04
• Subjects: INF Treaty -- Russia -- China -- arms control -- missiles; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1646466
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Whereas much of the debate about the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has focused on the European context and Russia's alleged treaty violations, Asia looms large in the minds of proponents of the United States's immediate withdrawal from the treaty. For many proponents, the fast-changing military balance in Asia and China's conventionally armed missiles constitute a sufficient cause for withdrawal. What does the end of the INF Treaty bode for the US-China military balance? This article argues that, although there are some near-term benefits for the US position in the conventional military balance with China, the advantages offered by prohibited missiles are minor and can be readily substituted by extant capabilities that are compliant with the treaty. Given the negative implications of the end of the INF Treaty for the future of arms control, the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the treaty require further examination; the military balance in Asia is an unpersuasive rationale for withdrawing from an important part of the arms-control architecture.