Setting a Good Example? The Effect of Leader and Peer Behavior on Corruption among Indonesian Senior Civil Servants. (27th May 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Silitonga, Mala Sondang; van Duijn, Marijtje; Heyse, Liesbet; Wittek, Rafael
• Is Part Of: Public administration review. Volume 79:Number 4(2019)
• Page Start: 565
• Page End: 579
• Publication Date: 2019-05-27
• Subjects: United States -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; Public administration -- Periodicals; 350
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13059
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0033-3352

Abstract

Abstract: Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal‐agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost‐benefit calculation by gain‐seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal‐framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past .