'The Only Creature God Willed For Its Own Sake': Anthropocentrism in Laudato Si' and Gaudium et Spes. (18th November 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Grey, Carmody T. S.
• Is Part Of: Modern theology. Volume 36:Number 4(2020)
• Page Start: 865
• Page End: 883
• Publication Date: 2019-11-18
• Subjects: Theology -- Periodicals; Philosophical theology -- Periodicals; 230.01
• DOI: 10.1111/moth.12588
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0266-7177

Abstract

Abstract: The Second Vatican Council's constitution Gaudium et Spes stated that man is 'the only creature on earth that God has willed for its own sake'. Post‐conciliar Catholic teaching on the environment largely reproduced this anthropocentric theology. Pope Francis' encyclical letter Laudato Si', however, appears directly to contradict this well‐established tradition with its repeated assertions of the intrinsic value of nonhuman life and its critical approach to the term 'anthropocentrism'. Questioning this putative discontinuity, this article challenges the perception that Laudato Si' has definitively rejected anthropocentrism. It suggests that the claim for the intrinsic value of nonhuman life, and the traditional assertion that man is the only creature willed for its own sake, can be seen to converge in light of the traditional theological anthropology of the human being as microcosm. On this view, the centrality of the human person in the order of creation is constituted by its gathering up of the sakes of creatures. The distinctive place of the human does not come at the expense of the rest of creation, but rather is the means of creation's movement towards the unity and harmony to which God calls it. Laudato Si' is distinguished not by its rejection of anthropocentrism, but by its refusal to set human and nonhuman over against one another. In contrast, the language of 'intrinsic value' is criticised for conceiving created value as a zero‐sum game, as though human and nonhuman value are in competition with one another; the language of 'stewardship' is criticised for its extrinsicist conception of the human being in the natural order.