Virtual reflection: Antoine Arnauld on Descartes' concept of conscientia. Issue 4 (3rd July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Schmal, Daniel
• Is Part Of: British journal for the history of philosophy. Volume 28:Issue 4(2020)
• Page Start: 714
• Page End: 734
• Publication Date: 2020-07-03
• Subjects: Descartes -- Arnauld -- virtual reflection -- consciousness -- late scholasticism; Philosophy -- History -- Periodicals; 109
• DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2019.1684238
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-8788

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms ( conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld's early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes' concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of 'reflexio virtualis' which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes' views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards.