Bicameralism and Minority‐Party Influence on Legislative Development: Evidence from House Standing Committee Votes. Issue 3 (30th December 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ryan, Josh M.
• Is Part Of: Legislative studies quarterly. Volume 45:Issue 3(2020)
• Page Start: 365
• Page End: 396
• Publication Date: 2019-12-30
• Subjects: bicameralism -- congressional committees -- filibuster -- cloture -- minority‐party power; Legislative bodies -- Periodicals; Parlement; Procédure législative; Système parlementaire; Étude comparée (Descripteur de forme); Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 328
• DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12267
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0362-9805

Abstract

Abstract : The ability of the minority party to influence legislation in Congress is debated. Most bills are passed with large bipartisan majorities, yet the House, where most legislation is developed, is seen as a majority‐party‐dominated institution. I develop a theory of House minority‐party influence at the committee markup stage as a result of the Senate's institutional rules. An original data set of congressional committee votes shows that minority‐party support in House committees predicts House and Senate passage. During unified party control of the chambers, an increase in Senate majority‐party seats results in lower minority‐party support for the legislation in the House committee, while during divided party control of Congress, the House majority passes more extreme bills as the chambers polarize. Even in the majority‐party‐dominated House, the minority's preferences are incorporated into legislation, and the Senate's institutional rules moderate bills to a significant degree.