EPR system based on a reward and punishment mechanism: Producer-led product recycling channels. (15th February 2020)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- EPR system based on a reward and punishment mechanism: Producer-led product recycling channels. (15th February 2020)
- Main Title:
- EPR system based on a reward and punishment mechanism: Producer-led product recycling channels
- Authors:
- Zhao, Yan
Wang, Wenju
Ni, Yuan - Abstract:
- Highlights: Implementation of the EPR system is affected by reward and punishment mechanism. Producers independent recycling channel have the highest efficiency. The smaller rewards and punishments, the third-party channel will be selected. The greater rewards and punishments, the distributors channel will be selected. Abstract: The discussion level of green development is constantly and exponentially growing, and the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system has become an important choice for the sustainable development of enterprises. To effectively manage the recycling of waste goods, this study uses the evolutionary game model to analyse the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism for the implementation of the EPR system and builds a producer-led reverse closed-loop supply chain model under effective conditions. Then, we compare and analyse the channel selection of producers in carrying out the reverse supply chain under the different mechanisms of rewards and punishments. The findings are as follows. (1) The choice of producers regarding the implementation of the EPR system is affected by the reward and punishment mechanism. (2) Through the comparison of different models of recycling channels, it is found that producer-led independent recycling channels have the highest efficiency. (3) The producer will choose either the entrusted distributor recycling channels or entrusted third-party recycling channels, according to the different rewards andHighlights: Implementation of the EPR system is affected by reward and punishment mechanism. Producers independent recycling channel have the highest efficiency. The smaller rewards and punishments, the third-party channel will be selected. The greater rewards and punishments, the distributors channel will be selected. Abstract: The discussion level of green development is constantly and exponentially growing, and the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system has become an important choice for the sustainable development of enterprises. To effectively manage the recycling of waste goods, this study uses the evolutionary game model to analyse the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism for the implementation of the EPR system and builds a producer-led reverse closed-loop supply chain model under effective conditions. Then, we compare and analyse the channel selection of producers in carrying out the reverse supply chain under the different mechanisms of rewards and punishments. The findings are as follows. (1) The choice of producers regarding the implementation of the EPR system is affected by the reward and punishment mechanism. (2) Through the comparison of different models of recycling channels, it is found that producer-led independent recycling channels have the highest efficiency. (3) The producer will choose either the entrusted distributor recycling channels or entrusted third-party recycling channels, according to the different rewards and punishments. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Waste management. Volume 103(2020)
- Journal:
- Waste management
- Issue:
- Volume 103(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 103, Issue 2020 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 103
- Issue:
- 2020
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0103-2020-0000
- Page Start:
- 198
- Page End:
- 207
- Publication Date:
- 2020-02-15
- Subjects:
- Extended producer responsibility (EPR) -- Reward and punishment mechanism -- Evolutionary game -- Stackelberg game -- Reverse supply chain
Hazardous wastes -- Periodicals
Refuse and refuse disposal -- Periodicals
363.728 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0956053X ↗
http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.wasman.2019.12.034 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0956-053X
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 9266.674500
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 13619.xml