Fansmitter: Acoustic data exfiltration from air-Gapped computers via fans noise. Issue 91 (April 2020)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Fansmitter: Acoustic data exfiltration from air-Gapped computers via fans noise. Issue 91 (April 2020)
- Main Title:
- Fansmitter: Acoustic data exfiltration from air-Gapped computers via fans noise
- Authors:
- Guri, Mordechai
Solewicz, Yosef
Elovici, Yuval - Abstract:
- Abstract: Computers that contain sensitive information are often maintained in air-gapped isolation. In this defensive measure, a computer is disconnected from the Internet - logically and physically - preventing accidental or intentional leakage of sensitive information outward. In recent years it has been shown that malware can leak data over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker. In order to eliminate such acoustic covert channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers in secured computers, thereby creating a so-called 'audio-gapped' system. In this paper, we present 'Fansmitter, ' a malware that can acoustically exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers, even when audio hardware and speakers are not present. Our method utilizes the noise emitted from the CPU, GPU, and chassis fans. We show that a software can regulate the internal fans' rotation speed in order to control their acoustic signal, known as blade pass frequency (BPF). Binary data can be modulated and transmitted over these audio signals to a remote microphone (e.g., a nearby smartphone). We present design considerations, including acoustic waveform analysis, data modulation and demodulation, and data transmission and reception. We evaluate the acoustic covert channel with various fans at different distances and present the results. We also discuss issues such as stealth, interference, and countermeasures. Using our method we successfullyAbstract: Computers that contain sensitive information are often maintained in air-gapped isolation. In this defensive measure, a computer is disconnected from the Internet - logically and physically - preventing accidental or intentional leakage of sensitive information outward. In recent years it has been shown that malware can leak data over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker. In order to eliminate such acoustic covert channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers in secured computers, thereby creating a so-called 'audio-gapped' system. In this paper, we present 'Fansmitter, ' a malware that can acoustically exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers, even when audio hardware and speakers are not present. Our method utilizes the noise emitted from the CPU, GPU, and chassis fans. We show that a software can regulate the internal fans' rotation speed in order to control their acoustic signal, known as blade pass frequency (BPF). Binary data can be modulated and transmitted over these audio signals to a remote microphone (e.g., a nearby smartphone). We present design considerations, including acoustic waveform analysis, data modulation and demodulation, and data transmission and reception. We evaluate the acoustic covert channel with various fans at different distances and present the results. We also discuss issues such as stealth, interference, and countermeasures. Using our method we successfully transmitted data from audio-less, air-gapped computers, to a mobile phone in the same room. We demonstrated an effective transmission at distances of 1–8 m, with a maximum bit rate of 60 bit/min per fan. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Computers & security. Issue 91(2020)
- Journal:
- Computers & security
- Issue:
- Issue 91(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 91, Issue 91 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 91
- Issue:
- 91
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0091-0091-0000
- Page Start:
- Page End:
- Publication Date:
- 2020-04
- Subjects:
- Network security -- Air gaps -- Computer viruses
Computer security -- Periodicals
Electronic data processing departments -- Security measures -- Periodicals
005.805 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01674048 ↗
http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.cose.2020.101721 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0167-4048
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 3394.781000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 13523.xml