Coordination and Party Change in the United States. Issue 6 (November 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lee, Daniel J.; Brady, Michael
• Is Part Of: American politics research. Volume 48:Issue 6(2020)
• Page Start: 807
• Page End: 821
• Publication Date: 2020-11
• Subjects: political parties -- party change -- coordination; Public opinion -- United States -- Periodicals; United States -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; 320.973
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X20921370
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1532-673X

Abstract

The ability of American political parties to change issue positions is potentially hindered by problems of coordination. Research on parties since the 1990s has shown what tools party leadership can use to enforce discipline and cohesion among its ranks. We, however, question whether those theories of party control, which explain party stability, can straightforwardly explain party change. Oftentimes we think of parties strategically altering issue positions, but what is "the party?" Rather than a monolithic group, American parties are relatively decentralized, weak, and individualistic compared with other party systems. We present an evolutionary game theoretic example to illustrate the problem of coordination in party change. This theoretical framework suggests an empirical focus on individual-level behaviors to better understand the dynamics of party change. We analyze roll call voting of members of Congress on the environment and abortion to illustrate micro-level behaviors suggested by our theoretical discussion.