A protracted iGAS outbreak in a long-term care facility 2014–2015: control measures and the use of whole-genome sequencing. Issue 1 (May 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Degala, S.; Puleston, R.; Bates, R.; Borges-Stewart, R.; Coelho, J.; Kapatai, G.; Chalker, V.; Mair-Jenkins, J.
• Is Part Of: Journal of hospital infection. Volume 105:Issue 1(2020)
• Page Start: 70
• Page End: 77
• Publication Date: 2020-05
• Subjects: Group A streptococcal -- iGAS -- Long-term care facility -- emm 11 -- GAS; Cross infection -- Periodicals; Cross infection -- Prevention -- Periodicals; Nosocomial infections -- Periodicals; Nosocomial infections -- Prevention -- Periodicals; Cross Infection -- Periodicals; Cross Infection -- prevention & control -- Periodicals; Infection Control -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; 614.44
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jhin.2019.12.004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0195-6701

Abstract

Summary: Background: In 2014, two residents of a long-term care facility (LTCF) developed invasive group A streptococcal (iGAS) infections with identical typing ( emm 11), resulting in one death. The second resident recovered but had a subsequent episode of emm 11 iGAS infection 10 months later. This second episode was linked to a third case, within 12 days, leading to a further outbreak investigation. Aim: To combine different techniques to establish whether this was a protracted outbreak, understand transmission pathways and inform appropriate control measures. Methods: Following a routine response to the first cluster, the second investigation included a care record review. This informed network analysis of case interactions with staff and visitors during 10 days prior to infection. These data were combined with post-outbreak whole-genome sequencing (WGS) using isolates from cases, and staff and resident screening (44 GAS isolates: 11 outbreak-related and 33 sporadic isolates). Findings: Two of the three confirmed iGAS cases died (one suffered two episodes). All iGAS cases, and six non-invasive isolates from 2015, were emm 11 (monophylogenetic WGS clade). Network analysis highlighted only indirect contact through staff–visitor interactions between iGAS cases in 2015. This suggested a common source and transmission propagation through carriage and/or environmental contamination over an 11-month period. Conclusions: This outbreak highlighted benefits of staff/resident screening and typing as part of routine response. Network analysis and highly discriminatory WGS clarified the protracted nature of the outbreak, supporting findings of hygiene and infection control issues and adding to our understanding of the epidemiology.