Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies. (September 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Escribà-Folch, Abel; Böhmelt, Tobias; Pilster, Ulrich
• Is Part Of: Conflict management and peace science. Volume 37:Number 5(2020)
• Page Start: 559
• Page End: 579
• Publication Date: 2020-09
• Subjects: Autocracies -- civil–military relations -- counterbalancing -- coup-proofing -- quantitative analysis; International relations -- Research -- Periodicals; Peace -- Research -- Periodicals; 327.17
• DOI: 10.1177/0738894219836285
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0738-8942

Abstract

How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes' counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.