Common learning and cooperation in repeated games. Issue 3 (6th July 2020)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Common learning and cooperation in repeated games. Issue 3 (6th July 2020)
- Main Title:
- Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
- Authors:
- Sugaya, Takuo
Yamamoto, Yuichi - Abstract:
- Abstract : We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.
- Is Part Of:
- Theoretical economics. Volume 15:Issue 3(2020)
- Journal:
- Theoretical economics
- Issue:
- Volume 15:Issue 3(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 15, Issue 3 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 15
- Issue:
- 3
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0015-0003-0000
- Page Start:
- 1175
- Page End:
- 1219
- Publication Date:
- 2020-07-06
- Subjects:
- Repeated game -- private monitoring -- incomplete information -- ex post equilibrium -- individual learning
C72 -- C73
Economics -- Periodicals
330.01 - Journal URLs:
- http://bibpurl.oclc.org/web/12933 ↗
http://www.econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/archive ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.3982/TE3820 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1933-6837
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 13338.xml