CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM. (30th August 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bognar, Greg
• Is Part Of: Economics and philosophy. Volume 35:Number 2(2019)
• Page Start: 259
• Page End: 281
• Publication Date: 2018-08-30
• Subjects: luck egalitarianism, -- brute luck, -- option luck, -- neutrality objection, -- equality of opportunity; Economics -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 330.01
• DOI: 10.1017/S0266267118000226
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0266-2671

Abstract

Abstract: The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can't be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what's known as the neutrality objection . I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.