HOW TO SOLVE HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. (13th September 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Jackson, Alexander
• Is Part Of: Episteme. Volume 16:Number 2(2019)
• Page Start: 157
• Page End: 174
• Publication Date: 2017-09-13
• Subjects: Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2017.32
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-3600

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This paper explains what's wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume's argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.