Equilibrium in vacation queueing system with complementary services. Issue 1 (2nd January 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ma, Yan; Liu, Zaiming; Zhang, Zhe George
• Is Part Of: Quality technology & quantitative management. Volume 14:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 114
• Page End: 127
• Publication Date: 2017-01-02
• Subjects: Multiple vacations -- queueing system -- game theory -- complementary services -- nash equilibrium; Quality control -- Periodicals; Quality control -- Statistical methods -- Periodicals; Industrial management -- Periodicals; Industrial management; Management -- Research -- Methodology -- Periodicals; Qualitative research -- Periodicals; Management; Quality control; Quality control -- Statistical methods; Periodicals; 658.00721
• DOI: 10.1080/16843703.2016.1191172
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1684-3703

Abstract

Abstract : This paper studies a queue with server vacations where customers need complementary services. The main service provider or the queue server may become absent for a random period of time called a vacation. More specifically, the server adopts a multiple vacation policy which means that the server keeps taking vacations until at least a customer waiting at the vacation completion instant. The secondary service provider offers an instantaneous service (no delay or no queue). The two services are complementary and a customer must receive both services if he or she joins the system. We investigate the equilibriums of such a system in a time-based fee model under competition and monopoly cases, respectively. Furthermore, a fixed or flat fee model is also analysed.