The knowledge norm of belief. (27th January 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Swindlehurst, Zachary Mitchell
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 9:Number 1(2020:Mar.)
• Page Start: 43
• Page End: 50
• Publication Date: 2020-01-27
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.441
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

Abstract: Doxastic normativism is the thesis that norms are constitutive of or essential to belief, such that no mental state not subject to those norms counts as a belief. A common normativist view is that belief is essentially governed by a norm of truth. According to Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, truth norms for belief cannot be formulated without unpalatable consequences: they are either false or they impose unsatisfiable requirements on believers. I propose that we construe the fundamental norm of belief as a knowledge norm, rather than a truth norm. I argue that a specific kind of knowledge norm—one that has a subject's obligation to believe that p depend on her being in a position to know that p —might avoid the well‐known formulation problems with truth norms.