The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat. Issue 1 (2nd January 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Case, Spencer
• Is Part Of: Australasian journal of philosophy. Volume 98:Issue 1(2020)
• Page Start: 92
• Page End: 104
• Publication Date: 2020-01-02
• Subjects: error theory -- nihilism -- self-defeat -- moral error theory -- epistemic normativity -- normative reasons -- Moore paradox; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2019.1582079
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0004-8402

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Many philosophers have noted that normative error theorists appear to be committed to saying 'Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it', which seems paradoxical. In defence of error theory, some have claimed that the word 'reason' in that statement is ambiguous between 'normative reason' and a purely descriptive sense of 'reason' that the error theorist can accept. I argue, however, that there is no descriptive sense of 'reason' that can prevent the paradox from re-emerging. Moreover, these implications of error theory probably provide good grounds for rejecting the view.