This is an interim version of our Electronic Legal Deposit Catalogue-eJournals and eBooks while we continue to recover from a cyber-attack.
RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS ACQUIRED SECOND NATURE: with Lluís Oviedo, "Challenges, Opportunities, and Suggestions for a Renewed Program in the Scientific Study of Religion"; Robert N. McCauley, "Recent Trends in the Cognitive Science of Religion: Neuroscience, Religious Experience, and the Confluence of Cognitive and Evolutionary Research"; Connor Wood, "Antistructure and the Roots of Religious Experience"; Konrad Szocik, "Critical Remarks on the Cognitive Science of Religion"; Hans Van Eyghen, "Religious Belief as Acquired Second Nature"; and Léon Turner, "Isolating the Individual: Theology, the Evolution of Religion, and the Problem of Abstract Individualism.". Issue 1 (19th February 2020)
Record Type:
Journal Article
Title:
RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS ACQUIRED SECOND NATURE: with Lluís Oviedo, "Challenges, Opportunities, and Suggestions for a Renewed Program in the Scientific Study of Religion"; Robert N. McCauley, "Recent Trends in the Cognitive Science of Religion: Neuroscience, Religious Experience, and the Confluence of Cognitive and Evolutionary Research"; Connor Wood, "Antistructure and the Roots of Religious Experience"; Konrad Szocik, "Critical Remarks on the Cognitive Science of Religion"; Hans Van Eyghen, "Religious Belief as Acquired Second Nature"; and Léon Turner, "Isolating the Individual: Theology, the Evolution of Religion, and the Problem of Abstract Individualism.". Issue 1 (19th February 2020)
Abstract: Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility.