The normative decision theory in economics: a philosophy of science perspective. The case of the expected utility theory. Issue 1 (2nd January 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Małecka, Magdalena
• Is Part Of: Journal of economic methodology. Volume 27:Issue 1(2020)
• Page Start: 36
• Page End: 50
• Publication Date: 2020-01-02
• Subjects: Philosophy of economics -- philosophy of science -- normative decision theory -- the normative turn in economics -- expected utility theory -- values in science; Economics -- Methodology -- Periodicals; 330.072
• DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2019.1640891
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1350-178X

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This article analyses how normative decision theory is understood by economists. The paradigmatic example of normative decision theory, discussed in the article, is the expected utility theory. It has been suggested that the status of the expected utility theory has been ambiguous since early in its history. The theory has been treated as descriptive, normative, or both. This observation is the starting point for the analysis presented here. The text discusses various ways in which economists and philosophers of economics have conceptualized the normative status of the expected utility theory, and it shows that none is satisfactory from the point of view of philosophy of science.