II–Joseph Melia. Issue 1 (13th August 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Melia, Joseph
• Is Part Of: Supplement to the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Volume 74:Issue 1(2000)
• Page Start: 77
• Page End: 92
• Publication Date: 2015-08-13
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Congresses; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-8349.00064
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0309-7013

Abstract

Abstract : In this paper I try to eliminate occurrents from our ontology. I argue against Simons' position that occurrents are needed to supply truthmakers for existential claims about continuants. Nevertheless, those who would eliminate occurrents still need some account of our willingness to assert sentences that logically entail their existence. Though it turns out to be impossible to paraphrase away our reference to occurrents, I show that the truthmakers for such sentences are facts that involve only continuants. This is enough to allow us to regard our ordinary talk about occurrents as fictional. Finally, I argue that a proper conception of the underlying temporal facts about continuants can both avoid the problematic tensed theory of time and the problem of temporary intrinsics.