Virtuous testimonial belief in young children. Issue 3 (3rd July 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ryan, Shane
• Is Part Of: South African journal of philosophy. Volume 38:Issue 3(2019)
• Page Start: 263
• Page End: 272
• Publication Date: 2019-07-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy; Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2019.1648122
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0258-0136

Abstract

Abstract : I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent's belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.