On the nature and origins of cognition as a form of motivated activity. (April 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Barrett, Nathaniel
• Is Part Of: Adaptive behavior. Volume 28:Number 2(2020)
• Page Start: 89
• Page End: 103
• Publication Date: 2020-04
• Subjects: Cognition -- motivation -- dissipative adaption -- ecological psychology; Animal behavior -- Periodicals; Animals -- Adaptation -- Periodicals; Adaptability (Psychology) -- Periodicals; Adaptation, Psychological -- Periodicals; Artificial intelligence -- Periodicals; 591.5
• DOI: 10.1177/1059712318824325
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1741-2633

Abstract

A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational "E cognition" is to reconceive the end-directed character of cognitive activity in naturally emergent but also experientially adequate terms. In short, it is necessary to show how cognitive activity is motivated . In this article, I present a preliminary analysis of the nature of motivation and the challenge that it presents to cognitive science. I make the case that a theory of motivation is a critical desideratum for dynamical theories of cognition, especially insofar as they understand cognition as a self-organized and "soft assembled" process. Finally, I propose that a branch of ecological psychology that conceives of cognition as a special variety of "dissipative adaptation" offers a promising framework for confronting this challenge.