How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China. (12th October 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Liu, Qigui; Luo, Tianpei; Tian, Gary Gang
• Is Part Of: Accounting and finance. Volume 59:Number 4(2019)
• Page Start: 2579
• Page End: 2619
• Publication Date: 2017-10-12
• Subjects: Anti‐corruption -- Mergers and acquisitions -- Ownership structure -- Political connections -- Property right law; Accounting -- Periodicals; Finance -- Periodicals; 657.05
• DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12302
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0810-5391

Abstract

Abstract: This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.