A Stealth Integrity Targeted Cyber‐Attack in Distributed Electric Power Networks with Local Model Information. Issue 1 (21st May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ahmadloo, Fatemeh; Salmasi, Farzad Rajaei
• Other Names: Karimi Hamid Reza guestEditor.; Wang Yueying guestEditor.; Shi Peng guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: Asian journal of control. Volume 21:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 545
• Page End: 558
• Publication Date: 2018-05-21
• Subjects: Cyber‐attack -- distributed system -- power network -- stealth attack; Automatic control -- Periodicals; Control theory -- Periodicals; 629.805
• DOI: 10.1002/asjc.1769
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1561-8625

Abstract

Abstract: Electric power networks are critical infrastructures, and their correct operation is of vital importance. Nowadays, these systems are prone to cyber‐attacks because of new vulnerabilities in the system and access to shared networks. In this paper, a novel Stealth Integrity Targeted Attack (SITA) is proposed in the context of distributed power systems. A distributed power system comprises several sub‐networks, or zones with dedicated control and monitoring centers. The overall system is represented by linear time invariant state space models with coupled dynamical and algebraic equations. In the proposed strategy, the attacker has access to only one of the sub networks; therefore, the attacker only requires local information about one of the power system zones. Primarily, the proposed attack policy is defined based on zero‐dynamics of the sub network. The intruder injects predesigned signals to both the local generation unit controller as well as local unsecured and controllable loads in the attacked zone. Moreover, the local measurement system, or the sensors of the targeted zone are tampered. Furthermore, it will be proved that although the neighbor zones have physical connections with the attacked zone, the injected adversary signals are designed as they do not impact other zones directly in order to conceal the local attack from neighbor control centers as much as possible. We provide some advice to system administrators to make the intrusion unfeasible or to reveal the attack. The simulations on IEEE‐118 bus test system illustrate the validity of the assertions.