II—Self-Awareness and Korsgaard's Naturalistic Explanation of the Good. (4th June 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Rowlands, Mark
• Is Part Of: Supplement to the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Volume 92(2018)
• Page Start: 133
• Page End: 149
• Publication Date: 2018-06-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Congresses; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1093/arisup/aky012
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0309-7013

Abstract

Abstract: This paper explores certain facets of Christine Korsgaard's paper, 'Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good' (2018). Korsgaard's account requires that an animal be able to experience 'herself trying to get or avoid something'. The claim that animals possess such self-awareness is regarded by many as problematic and, if this is correct, it would jeopardize Korsgaard's account. This paper argues that animals can, in fact, be aware of themselves in the way required by Korsgaard's account.