Three Concepts of Rights, Two of Property. (23rd March 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Webb, Charlie
• Is Part Of: Oxford journal of legal studies. Volume 38:Number 2(2018:Summer)
• Page Start: 246
• Page End: 269
• Publication Date: 2018-03-23
• Subjects: rights -- property -- private law -- legal reasoning -- legal theory -- tort; Law -- Periodicals; Law reviews -- Periodicals; 340.05
• DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqy006
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0143-6503

Abstract

Abstract: Sometimes rights are taken to describe concrete, bottom-line entitlements, sometimes a kind of ground of such entitlements. I suggest that this difference reflects not so much disagreement or uncertainty as to the nature of rights as different applications and senses of the term 'right', each expressing a different idea or concept. Much work on rights is compromised by a failure to distinguish these concepts of a right, nowhere more so than in private law, where it accounts for difficulties lawyers have faced when seeking to distinguish personal ( in personam ) and proprietary ( in rem ) rights.