Do patents enable disclosure? Strategic innovation management of the four-stroke engine. (20th July 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Sáiz, Patricio; Amengual, Rubén
• Is Part Of: Industrial and corporate change. Volume 27:Number 6(2018)
• Page Start: 975
• Page End: 997
• Publication Date: 2018-07-20
• Subjects: N70 -- N83 -- O32 -- O33 -- O34; Organizational change -- Periodicals; Organizational effectiveness -- Periodicals; Industrial management -- Periodicals; 658.4062
• DOI: 10.1093/icc/dty018
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-6491

Abstract

Abstract: A significant argument in favor of patents is that they enable knowledge disclosure, which compensates for their social cost. Although patent institutions can influence disclosure levels by what they require before granting patents, innovators have a natural bias to conceal key information because such knowledge can make a competitor's second-generation invention and patent more powerful. Despite interest in the subject, little empirical research has been carried out to analyze how much information patents actually disclose and how patentees and corporations historically manage these kinds of monopolies. Using a key case study of a radical innovation—the four-stroke engine, patented by Nicolaus August Otto in 1876—we conducted a detailed technical analysis of its patents in six countries. Our research provides new insights on issues related to full (or lack thereof) patent disclosure, the management strategies designed to maintain patent monopolies, and the effects of such monopolies on future innovation, knowledge, and control of marketplaces.