Technocratic Exceptionalism: Monetary Policy and the Fear of Democracy. Issue 4 (7th December 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Best, Jacqueline
• Is Part Of: International political sociology. Volume 12:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 328
• Page End: 345
• Publication Date: 2018-12-07
• Subjects: Political sociology -- Periodicals; International relations -- Periodicals; Political science -- Periodicals; Sociology -- Periodicals; 306.2
• DOI: 10.1093/ips/oly017
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1749-5679

Abstract

Abstract: What do border guards and central bankers have in common? Both operate, on a day-to-day basis, in political spaces exempt from many of the norms of liberal democratic politics and yet have the power to define and constrain them. In order to understand the role of such routine suspensions in the norms of liberal politics, we need to move beyond analyses that focus narrowly on security exceptionalism or emergency-management and pay attention to the practices of technocratic exceptionalism. Drawing on Foucault's lectures on biopolitics, I examine the ways in which economic theory and practice has sought to resolve some of the central tensions in liberalism by protecting the market from too much democracy—a kind of exceptionalism exemplified by the doctrine of central bank independence.