The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment. (15th November 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Rowland, Richard
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 78:Number 2(2018:Apr.)
• Page Start: 266
• Page End: 275
• Publication Date: 2017-11-15
• Subjects: Moral Disagreement -- Cognitivism -- Peer Disagreement -- Non-Cognitivism -- Metaethics; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/anx140
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: (1) a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; (2) it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that (1) holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of (1). And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that (2) holds.