Initial-Condition Dependence and Initial-Condition Uncertainty in Climate Science. (27th June 2018)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Initial-Condition Dependence and Initial-Condition Uncertainty in Climate Science. (27th June 2018)
- Main Title:
- Initial-Condition Dependence and Initial-Condition Uncertainty in Climate Science
- Authors:
- Werndl, Charlotte
- Abstract:
- Abstract: This article examines initial-condition dependence and initial-condition uncertainty for climate projections and predictions. The first contribution is to provide a clear conceptual characterization of predictions and projections. Concerning initial-condition dependence, projections are often described as experiments that do not depend on initial conditions. Although prominent, this claim has not been scrutinized much and can be interpreted differently. If interpreted as the claim that projections are not based on estimates of the actual initial conditions of the world or that what makes projections true are conditions in the world, this claim is true. However, it can also be interpreted as the claim that simulations used to obtain projections are independent of initial-condition ensembles. This article argues that evidence does not support this claim. Concerning initial-condition uncertainty, three kinds of initial-condition uncertainty are identified (two have received little attention from philosophers so far). The first (the one usually discussed) is the uncertainty associated with the spread of the ensemble simulations. The second arises because the theoretical initial ensemble cannot be used in calculations and has to be approximated by finitely many initial states. The third uncertainty arises because it is unclear how long the model should be run to obtain potential initial conditions at pre-industrial times. Overall, the discussion shows thatAbstract: This article examines initial-condition dependence and initial-condition uncertainty for climate projections and predictions. The first contribution is to provide a clear conceptual characterization of predictions and projections. Concerning initial-condition dependence, projections are often described as experiments that do not depend on initial conditions. Although prominent, this claim has not been scrutinized much and can be interpreted differently. If interpreted as the claim that projections are not based on estimates of the actual initial conditions of the world or that what makes projections true are conditions in the world, this claim is true. However, it can also be interpreted as the claim that simulations used to obtain projections are independent of initial-condition ensembles. This article argues that evidence does not support this claim. Concerning initial-condition uncertainty, three kinds of initial-condition uncertainty are identified (two have received little attention from philosophers so far). The first (the one usually discussed) is the uncertainty associated with the spread of the ensemble simulations. The second arises because the theoretical initial ensemble cannot be used in calculations and has to be approximated by finitely many initial states. The third uncertainty arises because it is unclear how long the model should be run to obtain potential initial conditions at pre-industrial times. Overall, the discussion shows that initial-condition dependence and uncertainty in climate science are more complex and important issues than usually acknowledged. 1 Introduction 2 Projections and Predictions 2.1 Predictions 2.2 Projections 3 Initial-Condition Dependence 3.1 Projections 3.1.1 Dynamical conditions justifying independence of initial conditions? 3.1.2 What projections can and cannot provide 3.2 Predictions 4 Initial-Condition Uncertainty 4.1 Projections 4.2 Predictions 5 Conclusion Appendix … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- British journal for the philosophy of science. Volume 70:Number 4(2019)
- Journal:
- British journal for the philosophy of science
- Issue:
- Volume 70:Number 4(2019)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 70, Issue 4 (2019)
- Year:
- 2019
- Volume:
- 70
- Issue:
- 4
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2019-0070-0004-0000
- Page Start:
- 953
- Page End:
- 976
- Publication Date:
- 2018-06-27
- Subjects:
- Science -- Philosophy -- Periodicals
501 - Journal URLs:
- https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/current ↗
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1093/bjps/axy021 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0007-0882
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 2316.000000
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 12106.xml