Accuracy and epistemic conservatism. (4th February 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Steinberger, Florian
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 79:Number 4(2019:Oct.)
• Page Start: 658
• Page End: 669
• Publication Date: 2019-02-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/any094
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism . Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk.