Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual "Presentations"?. (25th October 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Deutsch, Max
• Is Part Of: Metaphilosophy. Volume 50:Number 5(2019)
• Page Start: 631
• Page End: 648
• Publication Date: 2019-10-25
• Subjects: epistemology -- intuition -- perception -- phenomenology; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/meta.12384
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0026-1068

Abstract

Abstract: John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that "present" their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson's terminology of "presentations" is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for "presentation" or "presentational state, " and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson's theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.