A randomised scheme for secured modular exponentiation against power analysis attacks. Issue 4 (2nd October 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Barman, Moushumi; Mahanta, Hridoy Jyoti
• Is Part Of: Cyber-physical systems. Volume 5:Issue 4(2019)
• Page Start: 209
• Page End: 230
• Publication Date: 2019-10-02
• Subjects: CMOS -- power analysis attacks -- modular exponentiation -- DPA -- RSA; Cooperating objects (Computer systems) -- Periodicals; Internet of things -- Periodicals; 006.22
• DOI: 10.1080/23335777.2019.1637944
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2333-5777

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This paper presents an approach to compute secured modular exponentiation to mitigate power analysis attacks. Two processes have been designed based on 'multiply-always' binary method, which injects dummy multiplications so that the original multiplications can remain intact. The two processes are being invoked based on a random variable, which generated either 0 or 1. With these randomised modular exponentiation, the proposed approach can resist simple and differential power analysis attacks to a large extent. The proposed approach has been implemented using conventional 'squaring-multiplication' and 'Montgomery-Ladder' methods. Further, the work has also been extended to CRT-RSA, which is widely used for fast computation. The proposed method has been implemented for different key sizes of 1024-bit, 1536-bit and 2048-bit RSA & CRT-RSA. The analysis and results show that with a complexity of O ( n ), the proposed approach can resist some of the standard DPA attacks on modular exponentiation.