Collapsing the modal collapse argument: On an invalid argument against divine simplicity. (31st July 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Tomaszewski, Christopher
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 79:Number 2(2019:Apr.)
• Page Start: 275
• Page End: 284
• Publication Date: 2018-07-31
• Subjects: Divine simplicity -- modal collapse -- modal fallacy -- creation -- Leibniz's Law; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/any052
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: One of the most pressing objections against Divine simplicity is that it entails what is commonly termed a 'modal collapse', wherein all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition is rendered necessarily true. In this paper, I show that a common form of this argument is in fact famously invalid and examine three ways in which the opponent of Divine simplicity might try to repair the argument. I conclude that there is no clear way of repairing the argument that does not beg the question against the doctrine of Divine simplicity.