Aristotle's argument from truth in Metaphysics Γ 4. (4th October 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Clay, Graham
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 79:Number 1(2019:Jan.)
• Page Start: 17
• Page End: 24
• Publication Date: 2018-10-04
• Subjects: Aristotle -- demonstration -- principle of non-contradiction -- truth -- principle of bivalence -- Metaphysics Gamma; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/any004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: Some of Aristotle's statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this argument, it is the best argument that he could use to defend some of his statements in the second paragraph of Γ 4. Since the argument relies on only a few of Aristotle's core views about truth, I propose that it is faithful to his considered position throughout his corpus, and it may be the strongest argument he could offer for the indemonstrability of the PNC.