The Intention Principle and the Doctrine of Double Effect. (23rd June 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Saemi, Amir
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 79:Number 1(2019:Jan.)
• Page Start: 91
• Page End: 99
• Publication Date: 2018-06-23
• Subjects: Doctrine of Double Effect -- intention -- intentional action -- Intention Principle -- wrongful intention -- permissibility; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/any033
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: It is commonly believed that the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is identical with, or presupposes, the Intention Principle according to which an act can be impermissible if done with a wrongful intention. A main line of objections to the DDE, then, stems from the worry that the Intention Principle implausibly interiorizes the wrongness of an action. I will argue, first, that the DDE does not presuppose the Intention Principle, and, second, that intuitions brought against the Intention Principle do not warrant us to reject the DDE. Therefore, a main line of objections to the DDE is misguided.