It is not collusion unless you get caught: the case of 'Operation Car Wash' and unearthing of a Cartel. (26th April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Signor, Regis; Love, Peter E D; Vallim, João José C B; Raupp, Alexandre B; Olatunji, Oluwole
• Is Part Of: Journal of antitrust enforcement. Volume 7:Number 2(2019)
• Page Start: 177
• Page End: 202
• Publication Date: 2019-04-26
• Subjects: Cartel -- price fixing -- econometric model -- economic harm; K42; Antitrust law -- Periodicals; 343.0721
• DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnz009
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2050-0688

Abstract

Abstract: In this article, we present findings from the Brazilian Federal Police's ongoing investigation referred to as 'Operation Car Wash', which led to an accusation of collusive bidding being presented to a cartel that comprised 16 construction contractors. While plea bargains from several contractors within the cartel have materialized, additional evidence needs to be provided by the investigations officials to ensure the adequate application of justice. In this article, we provide scientific evidence that can be used by the Brazilian criminal courts to demonstrate the presence of collusive bidding. The contributions of this article are two-fold: (i) a robust and reliable econometric model to prove the presence of collusive bidding is implemented, which meets the basic criteria defined by the judicial system for scientific evidence; and (ii) the negative economic impact of collusive bid rigging is quantified, which was much higher than the percentage admitted by those involved in their leniency agreements.