Health as a Secondary Property. (1st September 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Broadbent, Alex
• Is Part Of: British journal for the philosophy of science. Volume 70:Number 2(2019)
• Page Start: 609
• Page End: 627
• Publication Date: 2017-09-01
• Subjects: Science -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx014
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0007-0882

Abstract

Abstract: In the literature on health, naturalism and normativism are typically characterized as espousing and rejecting, respectively, the view that health is objective and value-free. This article points out that there are two distinct dimensions of disagreement, regarding objectivity and value-ladenness, and thus arranges naturalism and normativism as diagonal opposites on a two-by-two matrix of possible positions. One of the remaining quadrants is occupied by value-dependent realism, holding that health facts are value-laden and objective. The remaining quadrant, which holds that they are non-objective but value-free, is unexplored. The article endorses a view in the latter quadrant, namely, the view that health is a secondary property. The article argues that a secondary property framework provides the resources to respond to the deepest objections to a broadly Boorsean account of natural function, and so preserves the spirit, though not the letter, of that account. Treating health as a secondary property permits a naturalistic explanation—specifically, an evolutionary explanation—of the health concept, in terms of the assistance such a concept might have provided to the survival and reproduction of those organisms that had it. (This approach is completely distinct from evolutionary and aetiological accounts of natural functions.) This provides the explanation, missing from Boorse's account, for the fact that function is determined with reference to the contribution to the goals of survival and reproduction, relative to the age of the sex of the species, rather than some other equally natural goals or reference classes. 1 Introduction 2 Two Ways to Disagree about Health 3 Secondary Properties 4 Health as a Secondary Property 5 Conclusion