On the KDM-CCA Security from Partial Trapdoor One-Way Family in the Random Oracle Model. (21st May 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Chang, Jinyong; Bian, Genqing; Ji, Yanyan; Xu, Maozhi
• Editors: Chen, Liqun
• Is Part Of: Computer journal. Volume 62:Number 8(2019)
• Page Start: 1232
• Page End: 1245
• Publication Date: 2019-05-21
• Subjects: key-dependent message (KDM) -- chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) -- partial trapdoor one-way family -- random oracle model; Computers -- Periodicals; 005.1
• DOI: 10.1093/comjnl/bxz044
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0010-4620

Abstract

Abstract: In PKC 2000, Pointcheval presented a generic technique to make a highly secure cryptosystem from any partially trapdoor one-way function in the random oracle model. More precisely, any suitable problem providing a one-way cryptosystem can be efficiently derived into a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme. In fact, the overhead only consists of two hashing and a XOR. In this paper, we consider the key-dependent message (KDM) security of the Pointcheval's transformation. Unfortunately, we do not know how to directly prove its KDM-CCA security because there are some details in the proof that we can not bypass. However, a slight modification of the original transformation (we call twisted Pointcheval's scheme) makes it possible to obtain the KDM-CCA security. As a result, we prove that the twisted Pointcheval's scheme achieves the KDM-CCA security without introducing any new assumption. That is, we can construct a KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme from partial trapdoor one-way injective family in the random oracle model.