Logic, logical form and the disunity of truth. (24th February 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gamester, Will
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 79:Number 1(2019:Jan.)
• Page Start: 34
• Page End: 43
• Publication Date: 2018-02-24
• Subjects: truth -- pluralism about truth -- monism about truth -- mixed inferences -- mixed compounds -- mixed conjunctions -- logic -- logical form -- truth-functional compounds; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/anx165
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of truth. Monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints, and there is a pluralistic theory that does so.