A Theory of Soft Capture1. (10th April 2017)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- A Theory of Soft Capture1. (10th April 2017)
- Main Title:
- A Theory of Soft Capture1
- Authors:
- Agrell, Per J.
Gautier, Axel - Abstract:
- Abstract: In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
- Is Part Of:
- Scandinavian journal of economics. Volume 119:Number 3(2017:Sep.)
- Journal:
- Scandinavian journal of economics
- Issue:
- Volume 119:Number 3(2017:Sep.)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 119, Issue 3 (2017)
- Year:
- 2017
- Volume:
- 119
- Issue:
- 3
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2017-0119-0003-0000
- Page Start:
- 571
- Page End:
- 596
- Publication Date:
- 2017-04-10
- Subjects:
- Information -- regulatory capture -- D72 -- L51
Economics -- Periodicals
330.05 - Journal URLs:
- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679442 ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1111/sjoe.12171 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0347-0520
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 8087.505700
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 11931.xml