A Joint Optimal Model of Pricing, Rebate Value, and Redemption Hassle. (5th April 2019)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- A Joint Optimal Model of Pricing, Rebate Value, and Redemption Hassle. (5th April 2019)
- Main Title:
- A Joint Optimal Model of Pricing, Rebate Value, and Redemption Hassle
- Authors:
- Zhang, Zelin
Popkowski Leszczyc, Peter
Qu, Riliang
Joseph, Kissan - Abstract:
- ABSTRACT: Although rebates are widely employed, redemption is not effort free, and the hassle of redemption is an important decision variable for buyers. The current research examines the impact of hassle cost on optimal rebate strategy. An analytical model is developed that simultaneously determines the supply chain's optimal price, level of rebate value, and rebate‐redemption hassle, while allowing for slippage (as consumers may forget to redeem a rebate), in both a centralized and decentralized supply chain. Results show that the level of rebate‐redemption hassle plays a key role in segmenting the market into rebate and nonrebate purchasers. Although in a centralized supply chain redemption hassle should increase in a convex manner with valuations, no such restrictions exist in a decentralized supply chain. This difference is due to double marginalization, which results in higher retail prices in the decentralized supply chain. Rebates can be used to reduce this double marginalization. Furthermore, a manufacturer in a decentralized supply should offer a more attractive rebate than in a centralized supply chain. We also find that changes in the supply chain's optimal price and rebate strategy are nonlinear and nonmonotonic in both production cost and elasticity for consumers' disutility for hassle. Finally, findings are all supported by results from numerical analyses. Overall, our work contributes theoretically and managerially to the study of rebates by jointlyABSTRACT: Although rebates are widely employed, redemption is not effort free, and the hassle of redemption is an important decision variable for buyers. The current research examines the impact of hassle cost on optimal rebate strategy. An analytical model is developed that simultaneously determines the supply chain's optimal price, level of rebate value, and rebate‐redemption hassle, while allowing for slippage (as consumers may forget to redeem a rebate), in both a centralized and decentralized supply chain. Results show that the level of rebate‐redemption hassle plays a key role in segmenting the market into rebate and nonrebate purchasers. Although in a centralized supply chain redemption hassle should increase in a convex manner with valuations, no such restrictions exist in a decentralized supply chain. This difference is due to double marginalization, which results in higher retail prices in the decentralized supply chain. Rebates can be used to reduce this double marginalization. Furthermore, a manufacturer in a decentralized supply should offer a more attractive rebate than in a centralized supply chain. We also find that changes in the supply chain's optimal price and rebate strategy are nonlinear and nonmonotonic in both production cost and elasticity for consumers' disutility for hassle. Finally, findings are all supported by results from numerical analyses. Overall, our work contributes theoretically and managerially to the study of rebates by jointly considering price, rebate value, and redemption hassle. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Decision sciences. Volume 50:Number 5(2019)
- Journal:
- Decision sciences
- Issue:
- Volume 50:Number 5(2019)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 50, Issue 5 (2019)
- Year:
- 2019
- Volume:
- 50
- Issue:
- 5
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2019-0050-0005-0000
- Page Start:
- 1060
- Page End:
- 1092
- Publication Date:
- 2019-04-05
- Subjects:
- Centralized -- Decentralized Supply Chain -- Pricing -- Rebates -- Redemption Hassle -- Segmentation
Decision making -- Periodicals
Policy sciences -- Periodicals
658.40305 - Journal URLs:
- http://estar.bl.uk/cgi-bin/sciserv.pl?collection=journals&journal=00117315 ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1111/deci.12365 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0011-7315
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 3537.150000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 11910.xml