Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting. (October 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Asako, Yasushi
• Is Part Of: Journal of theoretical politics. Volume 31:Number 4(2019)
• Page Start: 626
• Page End: 641
• Publication Date: 2019-10
• Subjects: Elections -- Political ambiguity -- Public promise -- Campaign platform -- Probabilistic voting -- Polarization; Political science -- Periodicals; 320
• DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875516
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-6298

Abstract

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters' most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72