II—Waking, Knowing, and Being Conscious. (20th June 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Stazicker, James
• Is Part Of: Supplement to the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Volume 93(2019)
• Page Start: 137
• Page End: 160
• Publication Date: 2019-06-20
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Congresses; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akz009
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0309-7013

Abstract

Abstract: Being conscious, in the sense in which this state is associated with being awake as opposed to dreaming or sleepwalking, has a distinctive experiential character and epistemic role. The former is reflected in the experience of waking up, the latter in traditional problems about perceptual knowledge. I outline a conception of being wakefully conscious which identifies this state in terms of its role in explaining knowledge about one's environment and oneself. I suggest that this dual epistemic role may be grounded, in part, in the control of attention. I argue that this conception has some advantages overMatthew Soteriou's (2019) account of the state in question in terms of a temporal point of view. These advantages are brought out by examining the experience of waking up, a traditional problem about perceptual knowledge, and folk attitudes to sleepwalking and infant consciousness.