A comparison between two health care delivery systems using a spatial competition model approach. Issue 1 (1st January 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Nishida, Kiheiji; Yoshida, Atsushi
• Is Part Of: Regional studies, regional science. Volume 3:Issue 1(2016)
• Page Start: 337
• Page End: 354
• Publication Date: 2016-01-01
• Subjects: Spatial competition -- fee-for-service reimbursement system -- diagnosis procedure combination/per diem payment system -- spatial price discrimination model -- health care delivery system -- medical arms race; Regional planning -- Periodicals; Regional economics -- Periodicals; Regional economics; Regional planning; Periodicals; 300
• DOI: 10.1080/21681376.2016.1209980
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2168-1376

Abstract

Abstract : Regional mal-distribution of healthcare providers such as hospitals and clinics is conspicuous in Japan. This study analyses whether Japan's fee-for-service reimbursement system (FFSRS) or its diagnosis procedure combination/per-diem payment system (DPC/PDPS) is the better solution for the problem, with reference to the Hotelling-style spatial competition model. Under FFSRS, we also consider two modes of competition: the Stackelberg case, in which providers can control the number of hospital visits, and the Nash case, in which providers cannot do so. Results indicate that competition under DPC/PDPS is the most intensive of the three modes of competition. To relieve the locational concentration of providers, we also find that DPC/PDPS has a better mechanism than FFSRS.