Leader-follower game-theoretic method towards carbon-economy trade-off in a key construction project group. (1st March 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Xu, Jiuping; Zhu, Mengyuan; Zhao, Siwei; Xie, Yachen
• Is Part Of: Journal of environmental management. Volume 233(2019)
• Page Start: 499
• Page End: 512
• Publication Date: 2019-03-01
• Subjects: Carbon emissions mitigation -- Construction supply planning -- Stackelberg game; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; Environmental management -- Periodicals; Environment -- Periodicals; Ecology -- Periodicals; 363.705
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.12.024
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0301-4797

Abstract

Abstract: Due to rapid urbanization and modernization, the construction sector now generates one third of all greenhouse gas emissions in China. Using an equilibrium strategy combined with the carbon allowance allocation, this study presents a synergistic Stackelberg model based on a construction project planning framework to deal with cumulative CO2 emissions. The bi-level model simultaneously considers the sequential decision-making relationship between the authority (leader) and the enterprises' interactive objectives and constraints. Unlike previous research, this bi-level model gives a holistic analysis of the interactivity of multiple stakeholders, thereby enabling the inherent conflicts and equilibrium between environmental protection and decision makers' profits to be reconciled and balanced. To deal with the bi-level model complexity, an interactive solution method that integrates an evolutionary mechanism and improved particle swarm optimization (IPSO) is designed for solving a construction supply planning problem. The robustness and practicality of the proposed methodology are then validated in a real world case, and sensitivity analyses under different carbon emissions quotas are also given. The results indicate that the methodology can systematically reduce carbon emissions in the Chinese construction sector, and when the authority has a strict emissions reduction altitude, construction practitioners are able to attain high carbon efficiencies; therefore, the model provides valuable strategy guidance for policymakers and business executives. Highlights: A leader-follower interactive method is designed to research the carbon-economy tradeoff. The analysis and optimization in CSP is handled with a bi-level modeling technique. A comparative carbon allowance discussion is demonstrated with different control scenarios. The proposed novel model is effective and can be used in other pollutants reduction problems.