Assertion and transparent self-knowledge. Issue 7 (3rd October 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Marcus, Eric; Schwenkler, John
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 49:Issue 7(2019)
• Page Start: 873
• Page End: 889
• Publication Date: 2019-10-03
• Subjects: Assertion -- Belief -- Self-Knowledge -- Transparency; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1519771
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

ABSTRACT: We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm 'Assert that p only if you believe that p'. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one's own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.