THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM: AN ABDUCTIVE APPROACH. Issue 1 (2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Mickelson, Kristin M.
• Is Part Of: Social philosophy and policy. Volume 36:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 154
• Page End: 172
• Publication Date: 2019
• Subjects: free will, -- moral responsibility, -- deterministic laws, -- incompatibilism, -- incompossibilism, -- impossibilism, -- best explanation; Social policy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 303.01
• DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000207
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0265-0525

Abstract

Abstract: This essay begins by dividing the traditional problem of free will and determinism into a "correlation" problem and an "explanation" problem. I then focus on the explanation problem, and argue that a standard form of abductive reasoning (that is, inference to the best explanation) may be useful in solving it. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the abductive approach, I apply it to three standard accounts of free will. While each account implies the same solution to the correlation problem, each implies a unique solution to the explanationproblem. For example, all libertarian-friendly accounts of free will imply that it is impossible to act freely when determinism is true. However, only a narrow subset of libertarians have the theoretical resources to defend the incompatibilist claim that deterministic laws ( qua deterministic) undermine free will, while other libertarians must reject this traditional incompatibilist view.